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Interest rate rules under financial dominance

Vivien Lewis () and Markus Roth ()

No 29/2018, Discussion Papers from Deutsche Bundesbank

Abstract: We study the equilibrium properties of a business cycle model with financial frictions and price adjustment costs. Capital-constrained entrepreneurs finance risky projects by borrowing from banks. Banks, in turn, make loans using equity and deposits. Because financial contracts are not contingent on aggregate risk, bank balance sheets are hit when entrepreneurial defaults are higher than expected. Macroprudential policy imposes a positive response of the bank capital ratio to lending. Our main result is that the Taylor Principle is violated when this response is too weak. Then macroprudential policy is ineffective in stabilizing debt and monetary policy is subject to 'financial dominance'. A too aggressive response of the interest rate to inflation can lead to debt disinflation dynamics that destabilize the financial sector.

Keywords: bank capital; financial dominance; interest rate rule; macroprudential policy; Taylor Principle (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: E32 E44 E52 E58 E61 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-ban, nep-cba, nep-dge, nep-mac and nep-mon
Date: 2018
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Related works:
Journal Article: Interest rate rules under financial dominance (2018) Downloads
Working Paper: Interest rate rules under financial dominance (2015) Downloads
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:zbw:bubdps:292018

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