Do G-SIBs engage in window-dressing behavior? An empirical analysis

Kamil Pliszka and Carina Schlam

No 19/2025, Discussion Papers from Deutsche Bundesbank

Abstract: This paper examines whether global systemically important banks (G-SIBs) engage in window-dressing behavior to circumvent or reduce regulatory requirements, increasing vul- nerability to economic shocks. Using a comprehensive global bank sample, we uncover ev- idence of such practices: G-SIBs reduce year-end exposures used for G-SIB capital buffer calculations, by roughly twice the magnitude of non-G-SIBs, and reverse these cuts early the next year. This pattern is strongest among G-SIBs that are near bucket thresholds or subject to high G-SIB capital surcharges.

Keywords: Capital Requirements; G-SIB Framework; Systemic Risk; Window Dressing (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: G21 G38 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2025
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:zbw:bubdps:324663

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