Managers and Students Playing Cournot: Experimental Evidence from Malaysia

Israel Waichman (), Till Requate () and Ch'ng Kean Siang

No 2008-19, Economics Working Papers from Christian-Albrechts-University of Kiel, Department of Economics

Abstract: We report results from a Cournot triopoly experiment with different subject pools: German students, Malaysian students, and Malaysian managers. While German students play Nash, we reject the hypothesis that both Malaysian students and managers select the Nash quantity. Moreover, Malaysian managers perform significantly less competitively than Malaysian students. Finally, the affect of gender is opposite for German and Malaysian subjects.

Keywords: artefactual field experiment; subject pools; Cournot oligopoly; managers; non-cooperative behavior (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 C93 D21 D43 L13 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2008
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-com, nep-exp, nep-mic and nep-sea
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:zbw:cauewp:7467

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