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Uncertainty, bargaining power and bargaining solutions: An empirical application

Gordon Klein () and Mayra Rebolledo

No 115, MEP Discussion Papers from University of Münster, Münster Center for Economic Policy (MEP)

Abstract: We compare the traditional model for structurally estimating bargaining power solutions assuming certainty on the disagreement payoffs against a model assuming evenly distributed bargaining power and uncertainty on disagreement profits. We find substantial differences in the distribution of the rent resulted from each of these models and it was hinted how the assumptions may have a role on the identification of the rent's distribution

Date: 2020
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-com and nep-gth
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