Price disclosure rules and consumer price comparison

Torben Stühmeier
Authors registered in the RePEc Author Service: Torben Stuehmeier

No 74, CAWM Discussion Papers from University of Münster, Münster Center for Economic Policy (MEP)

Abstract: Search frictions are regarded as a major impediment to active competition in many markets. In some markets, such as financial and retail gasoline, governments and consumer protection agencies call for compulsory price reporting. Consumers could then more easily compare the firms' offers. We showthat for a given level of price comparison, mandatory price reporting indeed generally benefits consumers. Such regulation, however, feeds back into firms' strategies, resulting in lower levels of price comparison in equilibrium. This effect may dominate so that the regulation lead to higher expected market prices.

Keywords: Mixed Strategies; Price Comparison; Regulation (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D83 L13 L51 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2014
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-com, nep-ind, nep-mkt and nep-reg
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Related works:
Journal Article: Price Disclosure Rules and Consumer Price Comparison (2015)
Working Paper: Price disclosure rules and consumer price comparison (2014)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:zbw:cawmdp:74

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