Why Do Managers Fight Shareholder Proposals? Evidence from SEC No-Action Letter Decisions
John Matsusaka (),
Oguzhan Ozbas and
No 262, Working Papers from The University of Chicago Booth School of Business, George J. Stigler Center for the Study of the Economy and the State
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