Persistence in corporate networks

Mishael Milaković, Matthias Raddant and Laura Birg

No 184, University of Göttingen Working Papers in Economics from University of Goettingen, Department of Economics

Abstract: We examine the bipartite graphs of German corporate boards in 1993, 1999 and 2005, and identify cores of directors who are highly central in the entire network while being densely connected among themselves. The novel feature of this paper is the focus on the dynamics of these networks. Germany's corporate governance has experienced significant changes during this time, and there is substantial turnover in the identity of core members, yet we observe the persistent presence of a network core, which is even robust to changes in the tail distribution of multiple board memberships. Anecdotal evidence suggests that core persistence originates from the board appointment decisions of largely capitalized corporations.

Date: 2014
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Journal Article: Persistence in corporate networks (2017)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:zbw:cegedp:184

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