How worker participation affects reciprocity under minimum remuneration policies: Experimental evidence

Katrin Köhler, Beatrice Pagel and Holger A. Rau

No 267, University of Göttingen Working Papers in Economics from University of Goettingen, Department of Economics

Abstract: We analyze the role of worker participation for the success of minimum remuneration policies. In our experiments employers remunerate workers doing a real-effort task. We vary the way how a minimum remuneration policy is introduced. In the worker-participation treatment, workers bargain with the employer on the enforcement of the policy. In the control treatment the policy is exogenously introduced. We find a pronounced effort increase after the policy was enforced. An exogenous introduction has detrimental effects, i.e., employers frequently pay a premium to maintain performance. Thus, worker participation may be an effective means for maintaining reciprocity under minimum remuneration policies.

Keywords: bargaining; experiment; real effort; worker participation (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C91 J31 J33 M52 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2015
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-exp, nep-hrm and nep-soc
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:zbw:cegedp:267

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