Privacy, trust and social network formation

Alexia Gaudeul and Caterina Giannetti

No 269, University of Göttingen Working Papers in Economics from University of Goettingen, Department of Economics

Abstract: We study in the laboratory the impact of private information revelation on the selection of partners when forming individual networks. Our experiment combines a "network game" and a "public-good game". In the network game, individuals decide with whom to form a link with, while in the public-good game they decide whether or not to contribute. The variations in our treatments allow us to identify the effect of revealing one´s name on the probability of link formation. Our main result suggests that privacy mechanisms affect partner selection and the consequent structure of the network: when individuals reveal their real name, their individual networks are smaller but their profits are higher. This indicates that the privacy costs of revealing personal information are compensated by more productive links.

Keywords: privacy; social networks; public goods; trust (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D12 D85 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2015
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cbe, nep-cdm, nep-exp, nep-gth, nep-net and nep-soc
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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Working Paper: Privacy, Trust and Social Network Formation (2015)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:zbw:cegedp:269

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