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Gender differences in honesty: The role of social value orientation

Kerstin Grosch and Holger Rau

No 308, Center for European, Governance and Economic Development Research Discussion Papers from University of Goettingen, Department of Economics

Abstract: This paper experimentally analyzes the determinants of the honesty norm in a lying game. The findings confirm common gender differences, i.e., men cheat significantly more than women. We detect a novel correlation between subjects' magnitude of concern they have for others (social value orientation) and their moral valuation of the norm honesty. The data suggest that individualistic subjects are less honest than prosocial ones. Interestingly, this difference can explain the gender differences we observe. First, we find that the distribution of social value orientation differs between gender, i.e., significantly more male subjects are characterized as individualistic subjects. Second, once we control for social value orientation the gender differential disappears.

Keywords: experiment; gender differences; honesty; social value orientation (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C91 H26 J16 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-dem, nep-exp, nep-gen and nep-soc
Date: 2017
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (4) Track citations by RSS feed

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