Renewable resource use with imperfect self-control
Holger Strulik () and
No 408, University of Göttingen Working Papers in Economics from University of Goettingen, Department of Economics
We investigate renewable resources when the harvesting agents face self-control problems. Individuals are conceptualized as dual selves. The rational long-run self plans for the infinite future while the affective short-run self desires to maximize instantaneous profits. Depending on the degree of self-control, actual behavior is partly driven by short-run desires. This modeling represents impatience and present bias without causing time inconsistent decision making. In a model of a single harvesting agent (e.g. a fishery), we discuss how self-control problems affect harvesting behavior, resource conservation, and sustainability and discuss policies to curb overuse and potential collapse of the resource due to present-biased harvesting behavior. We then extend the model to several harvesting agents and show how limited self-control exacerbates the common pool problem. Finally, we investigate heterogenous agents and show that there are spillover effects of limited self-control in the sense that perfectly rational agents also behave less conservatively when they interact with agents afflicted by imperfect self-control.
Keywords: self-control; temptation; renewable resource use; sustainability; common pool resource management (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D60 D90 O40 Q20 Q50 Q58 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cbe, nep-ene, nep-env, nep-gth and nep-ore
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Working Paper: Renewable Resource Use with Imperfect Self-Control (2020)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:zbw:cegedp:408
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