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Operating performance changes associated with corporate mergers and the role of corporate governance

Nicholas F. Carline, Scott Linn and Pradeep K. Yadav

No 04-08, CFR Working Papers from University of Cologne, Centre for Financial Research (CFR)

Abstract: We find that corporate governance characteristics of acquiring firms (board ownership, board size, and block-holder control) have an economically and statistically significant impact on operating performance changes following mergers. We also show that dispersion of intra-board ownership stakes is an important but heretofore overlooked factor when judging the influence of ownership on the outcomes of corporate choices. Finally, we present evidence that suggests the market sometimes under- or overreacts to merger news when initially revaluing merger partners but corrects any miscalculation following the consummation of the merger.

Keywords: Mergers; Corporate governance; Operating performance (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: G34 L25 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2009
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (27)

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