Economics at your fingertips  

On the choice of CEO duality: Evidence from a mandatory disclosure rule

Marc Goergen, Peter Limbach and Meik Scholz-Daneshgari

No 18-06, CFR Working Papers from University of Cologne, Centre for Financial Research (CFR)

Abstract: We adopt a novel approach to explain why firms opt for or against CEO duality and the value implications of this choice. Exploiting the 2009 amendments to Regulation S-K, we provide unique evidence on the first-time disclosure of the reasons firms state for combining (separating) the roles of CEO and chairman. The stated reasons support both agency theory and organization theory. They are more numerous and comprise more words, including more positive words, for firms with duality. Examining the announcement returns to firms' disclosures, we find that investors evaluate the main reasons for CEO duality by considering the firm's characteristics.

Keywords: CEO Duality; Board of Directors; Firm Valuation; Regulation S-K; Textual Analysis (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: G14 G34 G38 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2018
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-bec and nep-cfn
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: Track citations by RSS feed

Downloads: (external link) (application/pdf)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link:

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in CFR Working Papers from University of Cologne, Centre for Financial Research (CFR) Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by ZBW - Leibniz Information Centre for Economics ().

Page updated 2020-04-06
Handle: RePEc:zbw:cfrwps:1806