Limits of disclosure regulation in the municipal bond market
Ivan T. Ivanov,
Tom Zimmermann and
Nathan W. Heinrich
No 22-05, CFR Working Papers from University of Cologne, Centre for Financial Research (CFR)
We examine recent regulation requiring US municipal governments to disclose private debt. We show that governments fail to disclose 55-80% of reportable debt events and that, conditional on disclosure, filings often omit contract details essential for bond pricing. Non-compliant issuers are also riskier than compliers, with disclosure decreasing in the potential of private debt to adversely affect bondholders. Event studies suggest that disclosure reveals positive news and is especially informative to investors in low-rated bonds or during market turmoil episodes. Overall, private debt disclosure remains largely voluntary, highlighting challenges to recent federal initiatives to increase transparency for municipal bond investors.
Keywords: Bond pricing; disclosure regulation; private debt (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-fmk
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: Track citations by RSS feed
Downloads: (external link)
Working Paper: Limits of Disclosure Regulation in the Municipal Bond Market (2022)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.
Export reference: BibTeX
RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan)
Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:zbw:cfrwps:2205
Access Statistics for this paper
More papers in CFR Working Papers from University of Cologne, Centre for Financial Research (CFR) Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by ZBW - Leibniz Information Centre for Economics ().