Stakeholder capitalism, corporate governance and firm value

Franklin Allen, Elena Carletti () and Robert Marquez

No 2007/26, CFS Working Paper Series from Center for Financial Studies (CFS)

Abstract: We consider the advantages and disadvantages of stakeholder-oriented firms that are concerned with employees and suppliers as well as shareholders compared to shareholderoriented firms. Societies with stakeholder-oriented firms have higher prices, lower output, and can have greater firm value than shareholder-oriented societies. In some circumstances, firms may voluntarily choose to be stakeholder-oriented because this increases their value. Consumers that prefer to buy from stakeholder firms can also enforce a stakeholder society. With globalization entry by stakeholder firms is relatively more attractive than entry by shareholder firms for all societies.

Keywords: Firm Objective; Bankruptcy; Competition; Stakeholder Governance (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D02 D21 G34 L13 L21 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2007
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (31)

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Related works:
Working Paper: Stakeholder Capitalism, Corporate Governance and Firm Value (2009)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:zbw:cfswop:200726

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