Cost allocation in investment arbitration: Forward toward incentivization

James Nicholson and John Gaffney

No 123, Columbia FDI Perspectives from Columbia University, Columbia Center on Sustainable Investment (CCSI)

Abstract: In allocating costs in investment treaty arbitration, a "loser-pays" principle would incentivize economically-rational behavior by parties, including when deciding whether to bring a claim and/or settle. This principle would promote greater efficiency in investment treaty arbitration.

Date: 2014
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:zbw:colfdi:123

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