Is the party-appointed arbitrator a 'pernicious institution'? A reply to Professor Hans Smit

Giorgio Sacerdoti

No 35, Columbia FDI Perspectives from Columbia University, Columbia Center on Sustainable Investment (CCSI)

Abstract: Prof. Smit has expressed the view that eliminating party-appointed arbitrators would be beneficial for the integrity of the dispute settlement mechanism, especially in the investment field, because it would avoid any doubt of partiality and complacency. The author argues that these concerns can be met by the application of conflict-of-interest rules, obligations to disclose and oversight by arbitral institutions while retaining the appointment of arbitrators by parties as an essential valuable feature of arbitration as opposed to adjudication.

Date: 2011
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