Legal Cost Insurance as a Strategic Device

Roland Kirstein

No 97-11, CSLE Discussion Paper Series from Saarland University, CSLE - Center for the Study of Law and Economics

Abstract: Legal Cost Insurance (LCI) is not only a device to reallocate risk, but also to enhance an insured's position in a settlement negotiation. The paper points out that this function of LCI is especially important in cases that have a negative expected value for potential plaintiffs. Hence LCI is of interest even for risk-neutral customers.

Keywords: Legal Cost Insurance; Bargaining; Settlement (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: G22 K41 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 1997
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:zbw:csledp:9711

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