The "more economic approach" in EU merger control: A critical assessment
Arndt Christiansen
No 21e, Research Notes from Deutsche Bank Research
Abstract:
With the "more economic approach" the EU is taking a new tack on merger control policy. This is visible not only in the new SIEC prohibition criterion and the criteria for appraising horizontal mergers but also in more recent decision-making practice. Greater legal certainty, on the one hand, and improved decision-making, on the other, have been cited as the aims of the (increased) use of industrial economics models and quantitative analysis. The objective of a (better) economic foundation in EU merger control is expressly welcomed. However, on closer analysis it is found that in point of fact the more economic approach in its present form creates less legal certainty, while the upshot in terms of the quality of the decision-making is at least unclear. At the same time, the (administrative) burden is likely to rise. Moreover, certain problems emerge for instance from the increasing involvement of economic experts or the possibilities for (industrial policy-related) political intervention. In conclusion, a broader perception of an economics-based approach which takes account especially of the institutional implications is called for. Specific recommendations are the establishment of an independent competition authority and the stronger orientation of merger control to (more) general rules.
Keywords: Competition policy; EU merger control; economic analysis (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: F02 K21 L40 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2006
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations:
Downloads: (external link)
https://www.econstor.eu/bitstream/10419/21884/1/PROD0000000000196093.pdf (application/pdf)
Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.
Export reference: BibTeX
RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan)
HTML/Text
Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:zbw:dbrrns:21e
Access Statistics for this paper
More papers in Research Notes from Deutsche Bank Research Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by ZBW - Leibniz Information Centre for Economics ().