Bargaining power in manufacturer-retailer relationships

Justus Haucap, Ulrich Heimeshoff, Gordon Klein, Dennis Rickert and Christian Wey

No 107, DICE Discussion Papers from Heinrich Heine University Düsseldorf, Düsseldorf Institute for Competition Economics (DICE)

Abstract: Research on bargaining power in vertical relationships is scarce. It remains particularly unclear which factors drive bargaining power between negotiating parties in a vertical structure. We use a demand model where consumer demand determines the total pie of industry profits. Moreover, we apply a bargaining concept on the supply side to analyze how profit is split between retailers and manufacturers. Estimates show that bargaining power can be explained by several decision variables for retailers and manufacturers. Options for both indicate that any analysis of bargaining power has to consider a dynamic view on the relevant parameters.

Keywords: Bargaining Power; Buyer Power; Antitrust; Discrete Choice; Demand Estimation (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: L1 L4 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2013
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-com and nep-ind
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (7)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:zbw:dicedp:107

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