Price vs. quantity competition in a vertically related market
Chrysovalantou Milliou () and
Emmanuel Petrakis ()
No 146, DICE Discussion Papers from University of Düsseldorf, Düsseldorf Institute for Competition Economics (DICE)
This paper demonstrates that the standard conclusions regarding the comparison of Cournot and Bertrand competition are reversed in a vertically related market with upstream monopoly and trading via two-part tariffs. In such a market, downstream Cournot competition yields higher output, lower wholesale prices, lower final prices, higher consumers' surplus, and higher total welfare than Bertrand competition.
Keywords: Cournot; Bertrand; vertical relations; two-part tariffs (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D43 L13 L14 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-com and nep-ind
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (23) Track citations by RSS feed
Downloads: (external link)
Journal Article: Price vs. quantity competition in a vertically related market (2014)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.
Export reference: BibTeX
RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan)
Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:zbw:dicedp:146
Access Statistics for this paper
More papers in DICE Discussion Papers from University of Düsseldorf, Düsseldorf Institute for Competition Economics (DICE) Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by ZBW - Leibniz Information Centre for Economics ().