EconPapers    
Economics at your fingertips  
 

Full versus partial collusion among brands and private label producers

Irina Hasnas and Christian Wey ()

No 190, DICE Discussion Papers from Heinrich Heine University Düsseldorf, Düsseldorf Institute for Competition Economics (DICE)

Abstract: We analyze the incentives to collude when brand manufacturers compete with a private label producer of inferior quality. Full collusion is easier to sustain than partial collusion from the brands.perspective when horizontal differentiation is large and vertical differentiation is small. The private label firm is better off under full collusion than under partial collusion if goods are sufficiently homogenous (horizontal and/or vertical). Partial collusion could be preferred by the private label exactly when full collusion is easier to sustain. Improving the private label's quality makes full collusion more likely, either because it relaxes the brand producers' incentive constraint or because it shifts the preference of the private label firm from partial collusion to full collusion. Fully collusive behavior reveals itself through a nonnegative price effect on the brands' side caused by a quality increase of the private label good.

Keywords: Oligopoly; Product Differentiation; Private Label; Collusion (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: L11 L13 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2015
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-com, nep-ind, nep-ipr and nep-pr~
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (8) Track citations by RSS feed

Downloads: (external link)
https://www.econstor.eu/bitstream/10419/111909/1/829593187.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:zbw:dicedp:190

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in DICE Discussion Papers from Heinrich Heine University Düsseldorf, Düsseldorf Institute for Competition Economics (DICE) Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by ZBW - Leibniz Information Centre for Economics ().

 
Page updated 2023-11-08
Handle: RePEc:zbw:dicedp:190