Margin squeeze: An above-cost predatory pricing approach

Germain Gaudin and Despoina Mantzari

No 207, DICE Discussion Papers from Heinrich Heine University Düsseldorf, Düsseldorf Institute for Competition Economics (DICE)

Abstract: We provide a new legal perspective for the antitrust analysis of margin squeeze conducts. Building on recent economic analysis, we explain why margin squeeze conducts should solely be evaluated under adjusted predatory pricing standards. The adjustment corresponds to an increase in the cost benchmark used in the predatory pricing test by including opportunity costs due to missed upstream sales. This can reduce both the risks of false-positives and false-negatives in margin squeeze cases. We justify this approach by explaining why classic arguments against above-cost predatory pricing typically do not hold in vertical structures where margin squeezes take place and by presenting case law evidence supporting this adjustment. Our approach can help to reconcile the divergent US and EU antitrust stances on margin squeeze.

Keywords: Margin squeeze; Predatory pricing; Price-cost test; Abuse of dominance (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: K21 L12 L43 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2016
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-com and nep-law
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (6)

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https://www.econstor.eu/bitstream/10419/125793/1/845638726.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: MARGIN SQUEEZE: AN ABOVE-COST PREDATORY PRICING APPROACH (2016)
Working Paper: MARGIN SQUEEZE: AN ABOVE-COST PREDATORY PRICING APPROACH (2016)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:zbw:dicedp:207

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