How competitiveness may cause a gender wage gap: Experimental evidence
Hans-Theo Normann and
Holger A. Rau
No 213, DICE Discussion Papers from University of Düsseldorf, Düsseldorf Institute for Competition Economics (DICE)
We show that choices in competitive behavior may entail a gender wage gap. In our experi ments, employees first choose a remuneration scheme (competitive tournament vs. piece rate) and then conduct a real-effort task. Employers know the pie size the employee has generated, the remuneration scheme chosen, and the employee's gender. Employers then decide how the pie will be split, as in a dictator game. Whereas employers do not discriminate by gender when tournaments are chosen, they take substantially and significantly more from female employees who choose piece-rate remuneration. A discriminatory wage gap occurs which cannot be attributed to employees' performance.
Keywords: dictator game; discrimination; gender wage gap; laboratory experiment; real-effort task (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C91 J16 M52 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cbe, nep-exp, nep-hrm and nep-lab
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:zbw:dicedp:213
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