EconPapers    
Economics at your fingertips  
 

Using rival effects to identify synergies and improve merger typologies

Joseph Clougherty () and Tomaso Duso ()

No 25, DICE Discussion Papers from University of Düsseldorf, Düsseldorf Institute for Competition Economics (DICE)

Abstract: The strategy literature has found it difficult to differentiate between collusive and efficiencybased synergies in horizontal merger activity. We propose a theoretically-backed methodological approach to classify mergers that yields more information on merger types and merger effects, and that can, moreover, distinguish between mergers characterized largely by collusion-based synergies and mergers characterized largely by efficiency-based synergies. Crucial to the proposed measurement approach is that it encompasses the impact of merger events not only on merging firms (custom in the literature), but also on non-merging rival firms (novel in the literature). Employing the event-study procedure with stock-market data on samples of large horizontal mergers drawn from the US and UK (an Anglo-American sub-sample) and from the European continent, we demonstrate how the proposed schematic can better clarify the nature of merger activity.

Keywords: acquisitions; event-study; mergers; research methods; rivals; synergy (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-com and nep-ind
Date: 2011
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (9) Track citations by RSS feed

Downloads: (external link)
https://www.econstor.eu/bitstream/10419/48604/1/663606322.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
Working Paper: Using Rival Effects to Identify Synergies and Improve Merger Typologies (2010) Downloads
Working Paper: Using Rival Effects to Identify Synergies and Improve Merger Typologies (2010) Downloads
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:zbw:dicedp:25

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in DICE Discussion Papers from University of Düsseldorf, Düsseldorf Institute for Competition Economics (DICE) Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by ZBW - Leibniz Information Centre for Economics ().

 
Page updated 2019-04-13
Handle: RePEc:zbw:dicedp:25