Supplier search and re-matching in global sourcing: Theory and evidence from China
Fabrice Defever (),
Christian Fischer and
Jens Suedekum ()
No 273, DICE Discussion Papers from University of Düsseldorf, Düsseldorf Institute for Competition Economics (DICE)
In this paper, we consider a dynamic search-and-matching problem of a firm with its intermediate input supplier. In our model, a headquarter currently matched with a supplier, has an interest to find and collaborate with a more efficient partner. However, supplier switching through search and re-matching is costly. Given this trade-off between the fixed costs and the expected gains from continued search, the process will stop whenever the headquarter has found a sufficiently efficient supplier. Using firm-product-level data of fresh Chinese exporters to the United States, we obtain empirical evidence in line with the predictions of our theory. In particular, we find that the share of short-term collaborations is higher in industries with more supplier-cost dispersion, an indication of higher expected search opportunities.
Keywords: input sourcing; relational contracts; supplier search (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: F23 D23 L23 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cna and nep-tra
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: Track citations by RSS feed
Downloads: (external link)
Working Paper: Supplier Search and Re-Matching in Global Sourcing: Theory and Evidence from China (2017)
Working Paper: Supplier Search and Rematching in Global Sourcing - Theory and Evidence from China (2017)
Working Paper: Supplier Search and Re-matching in Global Sourcing - Theory and Evidence from China (2017)
Working Paper: Supplier search and re-matching in global sourcing: theory and evidence from China (2017)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.
Export reference: BibTeX
RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan)
Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:zbw:dicedp:273
Access Statistics for this paper
More papers in DICE Discussion Papers from University of Düsseldorf, Düsseldorf Institute for Competition Economics (DICE) Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by ZBW - Leibniz Information Centre for Economics ().