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Regulating advertising in the presence of public service broadcasting

Torben Stühmeier and Tobias Wenzel
Authors registered in the RePEc Author Service: Torben Stuehmeier ()

No 41, DICE Discussion Papers from University of Düsseldorf, Düsseldorf Institute for Competition Economics (DICE)

Abstract: Television advertising levels in Europe are regulated according to the Audiovisual Service Media Directive where member states of the European Union usually impose stricter regulation on their Public Service Broadcasting (PSB) channels. The present model evaluates the effects of symmetric and asymmetric regulation of ad levels on competition for viewers and advertisers in a duopoly framework where a public and a private broadcaster compete. If both broadcasters face the same advertising cap, regulation can be profit-increasing for both channels. If the public broadcaster is more strictly regulated, this may benefit the commercial rival if higher revenues in the advertising market outweigh the loss in viewership.

Keywords: media markets; two-sided markets (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: L82 L13 D43 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-com, nep-cul, nep-ind, nep-net and nep-reg
Date: 2012
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (9) Track citations by RSS feed

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