The impact of timing on bidding behavior in procurement auctions of contracts with private costs

Dakshina De Silva, Georgia Kosmopoulou, Beatrice Pagel and Ronald Peeters

No 54, DICE Discussion Papers from Heinrich Heine University Düsseldorf, Düsseldorf Institute for Competition Economics (DICE)

Abstract: We provide a comparison of bidding behavior between multi-round and single-round auctions considering bid lettings for asphalt construction contracts that are known to have primarily private costs. Using a reduced-form differenc-in-difference approach as well as the nonparametric estimation technique that was proposed by Racine and Li (2004) we find that bidding is more aggressive in a sequential multi-round setting than in a simultaneous single-round format. We explore potential causes for the bidding difference across formats that are related to synergies and the level of bidder participation.

Keywords: multi-unit auctions; procurement auctions (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D44 H57 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2012
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
https://www.econstor.eu/bitstream/10419/59002/1/717414019.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: The Impact of Timing on Bidding Behavior in Procurement Auctions of Contracts with Private Costs (2013)
Working Paper: The impact of timing on bidding behavior in procurement auctions of contracts with private costs (2010)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:zbw:dicedp:54

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in DICE Discussion Papers from Heinrich Heine University Düsseldorf, Düsseldorf Institute for Competition Economics (DICE) Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by ZBW - Leibniz Information Centre for Economics ().