Piracy in a two-sided software market
Alexander Rasch and
No 85, DICE Discussion Papers from University of Düsseldorf, Düsseldorf Institute for Competition Economics (DICE)
This paper studies the impact of software piracy in a two-sidedmarket setting. Software platforms attract developers and users to maximize their profits. The equilibrium price structure is affected by piracy: license fees to developers are higher with more software protection but the impact on user prices is ambiguous. A conflict between platforms and software developers over software protection may arise: whereas one side benefits from better protection, the other party loses out. Under platform compatibility, this conflict is no longer present.
Keywords: developer; piracy; platform; software; two-sided markets (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: L11 L86 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-com, nep-cul, nep-ind, nep-ipr, nep-pr~, nep-iue, nep-mkt and nep-net
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Journal Article: Piracy in a two-sided software market (2013)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:zbw:dicedp:85
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