Incentives for Process Innovations under Discrete Structural Alternatives of Competition Policy

Andrej E. Šastitko and Alexander Kurdin

EconStor Preprints from ZBW - Leibniz Information Centre for Economics

Abstract: This study analyses the incentives for process innovations under different conditions determined by the competition policy for intellectual property rights (IPR) and particular features of markets and technologies. Competition policy is defined by the presence or absence of compulsory licensing, markets are characterized by technological leadership or technological competition. The results of modelling show that the uncertainty engendered by technological competition may lower the intensity of innovative activities, if there are no mechanisms of coordination between participants. Voluntary licensing generally improves social welfare but does not guarantee an increase in innovative efforts. Compulsory licensing can impede innovations due to the opportunistic behaviour of market participants but certain measures of state policy can prevent this negative effect.

Keywords: competition policy; compulsory licensing; process innovations (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: K21 L24 O31 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2015-04-14
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-com, nep-ino, nep-ipr, nep-pr~ and nep-law
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https://www.econstor.eu/bitstream/10419/121851/1/92EC2015.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: Incentives for process innovations under discrete structural alternatives of competition policy (2016)
Working Paper: Incentives for Process Innovations Under Discrete Structural Alternatives of Competition Policy (2015)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:zbw:esprep:121851

DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.2594664

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