Effects of Hostility Tradition in Antitrust: Leniency Programs and Cooperation Agreements

Natalia Pavlova and Andrey Shastitko

EconStor Preprints from ZBW - Leibniz Information Centre for Economics

Abstract: The article focuses on the effects that type I errors can have on the incentives of firms to compete, collude or engage in efficiency promoting socially beneficial cooperation. Our results confirm that in the presence of type I errors the introduction of a leniency program can have ambiguous effects, including the destruction and prevention of welfare enhancing horizontal cooperation agreements. The obtained results help understand the negative impact the hostility tradition resulting in type I enforcement errors can have on social welfare when applied to the regulation of horizontal agreements.

Keywords: antitrust; competition; collusion; cooperation agreements; leniency; errors (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D43 K21 L41 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2014-04-17
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-com and nep-law
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

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Related works:
Working Paper: Effects Of Hostility Tradition In Antitrust: Leniency Programs And Cooperation Agreements (2014)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:zbw:esprep:122051

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