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Individual and Group Preferences Over Risk: An Experiment

Andrea Morone and Tiziana Temerario

EconStor Preprints from ZBW - Leibniz Information Centre for Economics

Abstract: The recent literature on individual and group choices over risk has led to different results. In some studies under unanimity, groups were found to be less risk averse than individuals, while those under majority did not highlight significant differences. However, both the types of studies impose the decision rule to the group. In the present work we elicited groups' preference under risk using a consensus rule, i.e. groups are free to solve disagreement endogenously, just as in the real life. Results from our pairwise choices experiment shows that when group members are free to use any rule they want in order to reach unanimity, there is no statistical difference between individuals' and groups' risk aversion.

Keywords: Group Preferences; Risk; Individual Preferences; Lab (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C9 C90 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2016
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cbe, nep-cdm, nep-exp and nep-upt
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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