The Armadollar-Petrodollar Coalition: Demise or New Order?

Shimshon Bichler, Robin Rowley and Jonathan Nitzan

EconStor Preprints from ZBW - Leibniz Information Centre for Economics

Abstract: This is the final paper in a series of four essays that deal with the political economy of armament and oil. Since the 1980s, military imports to the Middle East increased while revenues from oil exports declined substantially. These disparities highlight structural changes which affect the Armadollar-Petrodollar Coalition of large armament and oil companies. Relations between oil producing countries and petroleum companies were restructured and there was a surge in corporate concentration. A ‘military bias’ in Europe and Japan increased the global competition for military orders but also enhances the cohesiveness of an emerging international armament lobby of military contractors. In addition, the domestic influence of the U.S. Armament Core was heightened by corporate concentration and symbiotic relations between contractors and the Pentagon. The two sides of the Armadollar-Petrodollar Coalition have consolidated their positions and may again seek to benefit from renewed cycles of armed conflicts and oil crises in the Middle East.

Keywords: arms exports; arma-core; concentration; corporation; elite; Europe; free flow; foreign policy; institutionalized waste; Japan; limited flow; Middle East; Asia; military contractors; military spending; national security; oil; OPEC; petro-core; petrodollars (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 1989
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (15)

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