EconPapers    
Economics at your fingertips  
 

Competing Combinatorial Auctions

Thomas Kittsteiner, Marion Ott and Richard Steinberg

EconStor Preprints from ZBW - Leibniz Information Centre for Economics

Abstract: We investigate if and how revenue-maximizing auctioneers restrict combinatorial bidding in the presence of auctioneer competition. Two sellers offer the same set of two heterogeneous items to six bidders in a VCG mechanism. Each bidder desires either the first item, the second item, or the package of both items. First, each seller decides on which packages to allow bids. Then, each bidder selects which of the two sellers’ auctions to participate in. We find that, in contrast to a monopolistic seller, duopolistic sellers do not both offer an unrestricted VCG mechanism, i.e., a combinatorial auction. Rather they segment the market via their respective choice of allowable package bids: One seller attracts bidders who desire a single item; the other seller attracts bidders who desire both items.

Keywords: Auctioneer competition; Combinatorial auctions; VCG mechanism (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D44 C72 D82 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2017
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-com, nep-des, nep-exp, nep-gth and nep-reg
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: Track citations by RSS feed

Downloads: (external link)
https://www.econstor.eu/bitstream/10419/171995/1/C ... inberg_22Nov2017.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:zbw:esprep:171995

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in EconStor Preprints from ZBW - Leibniz Information Centre for Economics Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by ZBW - Leibniz Information Centre for Economics ().

 
Page updated 2020-07-09
Handle: RePEc:zbw:esprep:171995