EconPapers    
Economics at your fingertips  
 

CEO power and board structure of banks: a developing country’s perspective

David Adeabah ()

EconStor Preprints from ZBW - Leibniz Information Centre for Economics

Abstract: This study examines the implications of CEO power on the board structure of banks in the Ghanaian banking industry. Using a unique hand-collected dataset in respect of 21 commercial banks in Ghana for the 2009 – 2017 periods, the results show that CEO power underscores the absence or lack of gender composition of bank boards and constrains independent directors, while incentivizing larger board size in banks. Meanwhile, ownership structure and listing status critically underpin the CEO power effect on bank board structure, such that the actual sign of the marginal effect of CEO power on bank board structure varies with ownership structure and listing status. Overall, the study contributes to the understanding of the global antecedent of bank corporate governance (i.e. board structure) by providing an understanding of the implications of social connection hypothesis on bank board structure in a developing country's context.

Keywords: CEO Power; Board Structure; Gender Diversity; Board Size; Board Independence; Social Connection (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: G21 G30 G32 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2018
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cfn and nep-hme
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: Track citations by RSS feed

Downloads: (external link)
https://www.econstor.eu/bitstream/10419/191529/1/C ... _Board_Structure.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:zbw:esprep:191529

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in EconStor Preprints from ZBW - Leibniz Information Centre for Economics Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by ZBW - Leibniz Information Centre for Economics ().

 
Page updated 2022-06-30
Handle: RePEc:zbw:esprep:191529