Setting new behavioural standards: Sustainabilty pledges and how conformity impacts their outreach

Ann-Kathrin Koessler ()

EconStor Preprints from ZBW - Leibniz Information Centre for Economics

Abstract: Sustainability pledges are en vogue. In the business sector, but also in climate negotiations, pledges are used to signal actors' intention to act pro-environmentally. Laboratory experiments testify to the potential effectiveness of these public declarations. Previous work has examined under which conditions subsequent trust and cooperation can flourish. In this study, I postulate that also conformity is an important determinant for the effectiveness of pledges. In specific, I examine what role social influence plays in the decision to pledge. In a public good game, subjects can make prior play a pledge to contribute to the public good in the socially optimal way. Across treatment conditions, I vary the way in which the pledges are elicited. Hence, the degree of social influence on pledge making is manipulated and its impact can be examined. I find that when individuals are aware that the majority of other subjects decided to pledge, they are likely to conform and also make the pledge. The emergence of such a critical mass can be stimulated when the elicitation of pledges is based on previous contribution behavior. Overall, this commitment nudge is effective. Both socially-oriented and previously not socially-oriented subjects modify their behavior after the pledge.

Keywords: voluntary approaches; environmental policy; pledge; social dilemma; public good; commitment; conformism (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: A13 C72 C91 H41 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2019
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm, nep-env and nep-exp
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (5)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:zbw:esprep:195048

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