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The role of overconfidence in overweighting private information: Does gender matter?

Qian Cao, Jianbiao Li and Xiaofei Niu ()

EconStor Preprints from ZBW - Leibniz Information Centre for Economics

Abstract: This paper analyzes gender differences of overweighting private information in a social learning game. The results show that male participants’ fraction of choosing in line with private signal is significantly higher than female, i.e. men are more likely to follow their own private information than women. This gender effect is primarily salient in the incongruent rounds where a participant receives a private signal that is against with majority of the public information. However, no significant gender differences of overweighting private information are found in the congruent rounds where a participant receives a private signal that matches with majority of public information. In addition, we find that overweighting private information is positively correlated with overconfidence; men are more overconfident than women; a mediation analysis reveals that overconfidence explains the gender differences of overweighting private information.

Keywords: overweighting private information; gender; overconfidence (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C91 D81 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cse, nep-exp and nep-gen
Date: 2019
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:zbw:esprep:203448

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