An evolutionary explanation for the propensity to migrate

Alexei Savvateev and Oded Stark

EconStor Preprints from ZBW - Leibniz Information Centre for Economics

Abstract: We explore the evolutionary dynamics of a population that consists of cooperators and defectors, wherein each member of the many pairs of players of a one-shot prisoner's dilemma game is drawn at random, and the number of descendents positively depends on the payoffs in the game. We demonstrate how an inclination to migrate may be mapped onto the overall evolutionary fitness of the cooperators. The threshold value of the inclination to migrate parameter is obtained. Intensities of migration higher than that value guarantee that in the long run, the population will consist entirely of cooperators. The threshold value is characterized by the payoff parameters lying at the base of the evolutionary dynamics.

Keywords: Haystacks-type model; Prisoner's dilemma game; Inclination to migrate; Evolution of cooperation; Taste for migration (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: A12 A13 D64 R23 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2005
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Working Paper: An evolutionary explanation for the propensity to migrate (2005)
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