Thou shalt not steal: Taking aversion with legal property claims

Marco Faillio, Matteo Rizzolli and Stephan Tontrup

EconStor Preprints from ZBW - Leibniz Information Centre for Economics

Abstract: Some recent experimental literature on the taking game (a variation of the dictator game) suggests that human subjects may generally be taking averse, implying that the moral cost of taking exceeds the moral cost of not giving. In our experiment, our subjects could decide to take tangible objects (lottery scratchcards) brought from outside the lab and thus legally owned by other subjects. This legal treatment was compared with a more standard one where subjects earned their scratchcards inside the lab. Evidence is provided of a (weak) taking aversion that is greater when property is established inside the lab via an effort task than when it is pre-existing and legally enforceable outside the lab.

Keywords: property rights; taking game; taking aversion; methodology; strict anonymity; earned property rights; real property; free form dictator game (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C91 D23 K11 P14 P26 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2019
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:zbw:esprep:335578

DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.3500945

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