Inter-generational thoughtfulness in a dynamic public good experiment
Jörg Spiller () and
No 383, Discussion Papers from European University Viadrina Frankfurt (Oder), Department of Business Administration and Economics
In a laboratory experiment we investigate inter-generational concerns and myopia in a dynamic Public Good game. Groups of four played a 15-period game where they could either invest in a green sector or in a more profitable brown sector that builds a pollution stock. We find that subjects are more cooperative when their final pollution stock will be inherited by another group in a later session. Furthermore, we observe that defection from a negotiated common plan is higher when subjects are in a loss frame, negotiated plans are more ambitious. We analyze our results in reference to several social preference theories and find that Linear Altruism is most supported in such a dynamic environment.
Keywords: Dynamic; Environmental Economics; Experimental Economics; Inter-Generation; Public Good (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: H41 C91 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cbe, nep-cdm, nep-ene, nep-env, nep-exp and nep-pbe
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Working Paper: Inter-Generational Thoughtfulness in a Dynamic Public Good Experiment (2013)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:zbw:euvwdp:383
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