To vaccinate or not to vaccinate? This is the question! Delay the Booster, maybe you get a Bratwurscht!

Karl-Heinz Moritz and Georg Stadtmann

No 426, Discussion Papers from European University Viadrina Frankfurt (Oder), Department of Business Administration and Economics

Abstract: A game-theoretic setting is used to illuminate the conflict between vaccination proponents and vaccination opponents. A central result is that vaccination proponents could in principle persuade vaccination opponents to vaccinate by means of subsidization. Such a subsidy could increase benefits for both groups. Deeper analysis provides numerous further insights regarding the stability of these results.

Keywords: vaccination; corona; covid; game theory; moral hazard (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2021
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:zbw:euvwdp:426

DOI: 10.11584/opus4-1231

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