Monetary transmission under competing corporate finance regimes

Paul De Grauwe and Eddie Gerba ()

No 52, FinMaP-Working Papers from Collaborative EU Project FinMaP - Financial Distortions and Macroeconomic Performance: Expectations, Constraints and Interaction of Agents

Abstract: The behavioural agent-based framework of De Grauwe and Gerba (2015) is extended to allow for a counterfactual exercise on the role of banks for monetary transmissions. A bank-based corporate financing friction is introduced and the relative contribution of that friction to the effectiveness of monetary policy is evaluated. We find convincing evidence that the monetary transmission channel is stronger in the bank-based system compared to the market-based. Impulse responses to a monetary expansion are around the double of those in the market-based framework. The (asymmetric) effectiveness of monetary policy in counteracting busts is, on the other hand, relatively higher in the market-based model. The statistical fit of the bank-based behavioural model is also improved compared to the benchmark model. Lastly, we find that a market-based (bankbased) financing friction in a general equilibrium produces highly asymmetric (symmetric) distributions and more (less) pronounced business cycles.

Keywords: monetary policy in the EA; monetary transmissions; banks; financial frictions; market based finance (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: E03 E44 E52 G21 G32 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2016
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cba, nep-mac and nep-mon
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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Journal Article: Monetary transmission under competing corporate finance regimes (2017)
Journal Article: Monetary transmission under competing corporate finance regimes (2017)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:zbw:fmpwps:52

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