Schaeffler KG/ Continental AG im Lichte der CSX Corp.-Entscheidung des US District Court for the Southern District of New York: Meldepflichten bei öffentlichen Übernahmen und deren Umgehung durch Einsatz von derivativen Finanzinstrumenten

Kay-Michael Schanz

No 100, Frankfurt School - Working Paper Series from Frankfurt School of Finance and Management

Abstract: This report analyses the possibility to outflank disclosure obligations under the German Securities Trading Act as well as the German Takeover Act by using derivative instruments in the context of the attack of Schaeffler KG on Continental AG. Irrespective of a limited knowledge of the complete facts it comes to the conclusion that, under certain conditions, there are good reasons to assume violations of legal obligations that would entitle the Federal Financial Supervisory Authority to fix hefty fines but not to prohibit the offer.

Keywords: Public takeovers; hostile takeovers; notification requirements; cash-settled equity total return swaps; cash swaps; equity options; options; mandatory offer; insider trading; capital markets; regulated markets; tender offer; tender offer rules; announcement obligations; securities trading act; takeover act; Schaeffler; Contigummi; Continental; BaFin; Bundesanstalt für Finanzdienstleistungsaufsicht; CSX; The Children´s Investment Fund Management; TCI (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: K12 K19 K22 K29 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2008
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:zbw:fsfmwp:100

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