Wider die Verschleuderung von Unternehmen durch Pfandversteigerung

Daniel Schütze

No 51, Frankfurt School - Working Paper Series from Frankfurt School of Finance and Management

Abstract: Pledges on shares and stocks are common as securities for loans. New are the attempts by pledgees to sell pledges in public auctions. The questions regarding the requirements for such public auctions have not been answered either by Ge rman court decisions or literature. This fact helps the pledgees to buy the former pledges in public auctions themselves at a price much lower than their fair market value. This makes it necessary in the interests of the pledgor to show which formal requirements the law provides for public auctions. These formal requirements should prohibit pledges from being sold for less than their fair market value.

Keywords: auction; auction of equity participation; auction of the pledge; public auction of the pledge; public auction by a notary; public notice; examination of the pledge; data room; formal rules of a public auction (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: K00 K19 K22 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2004
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:zbw:fsfmwp:51

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