A political theory of Russian orthodoxy: Evidence from public goods experiments

Theocharis Grigoriadis

No 2013/14, Discussion Papers from Free University Berlin, School of Business & Economics

Abstract: In this paper, I test the effects of religious norms on the provision of public goods. My evidence is drawn from public goods experiments that I ran with regional bureaucrats in Tomsk and Novosibirsk, Russia. I introduce three treatments, which I define as degrees of Eastern Orthodox collectivist enforcement: 1. Solidarity, 2. Obedience, and 3. Universal discipline. I argue for the existence of an Eastern Orthodox hierarchy in the Russian bureaucracy that facilitates the delivery of public goods under conditions of universal discipline and the principal´s overfulfillment. Eastern Orthodox hierarchy is enforced through universal disciplinary monitoring, which induces collective punishment when the public good is not delivered. Contrary to conventional wisdom about freeriding in administrative institutions, higher ranks in Russian bureaucracies are associated with less freeriding.

Keywords: public goods experiments; bureaucracy; enforcement; Russia; religion; incomplete information; hierarchy (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C91 C92 D72 D73 P21 P26 P32 P51 Z12 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2013
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cbe, nep-cdm, nep-cis, nep-exp, nep-pbe, nep-pol and nep-tra
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:zbw:fubsbe:201314

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