Exit options and the allocation of authority

Helmut Bester and Daniel Krähmer

No 2013/5, Discussion Papers from Free University Berlin, School of Business & Economics

Abstract: We analyze the optimal allocation of authority in an organization whose members have conflicting preferences. One party has decision-relevant private information, and the party who obtains authority decides in a self-interested way. As a novel element in the literature on decision rights, we consider exit option contracts: the party without decision rights is entitled to prematurely terminate the relation after the other party's choice. We show that under such a contract it is always optimal to assign authority to the informed and not to the uninformed party, irrespective of the parties' conflict of interest. Indeed, the first-best efficient solution can be obtained by such a contract.

Keywords: authority; decision rights; exit options; incomplete contracts; asymmetric information (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D23 D82 D86 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2013
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm, nep-cta and nep-hrm
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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Related works:
Working Paper: Exit Options and the Allocation of Authority (2013)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:zbw:fubsbe:20135

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