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Asymmetric obligations

Nadine Riedel () and Hannah Schildberg-Hörisch
Authors registered in the RePEc Author Service: Hannah Schildberg-Hoerisch ()

No 28-2011, FZID Discussion Papers from University of Hohenheim, Center for Research on Innovation and Services (FZID)

Abstract: We use a laboratory experiment to investigate the behavioral effects of obligations that are not backed by binding deterrent incentives. To implement such expressive law' we introduce different levels of very weakly incentivized, symmetric and asymmetric minimum contribution levels (obligations) in a repeated public goods experiment. The results provide evidence for a weak expressive function of law: while the initial impact of high obligations on behavior is strong, it decreases over time. Asymmetric obligations are as effective as symmetric ones. Our results are compatible with the argument that expressive law affects behavior by attaching an emotional cost of disobeying the own obligation.

Keywords: Non-binding Obligations; Expressive law; Public goods; Experiment (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C92 H41 K40 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2011
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cbe and nep-exp
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https://www.econstor.eu/bitstream/10419/45628/1/658948806.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: Asymmetric obligations (2013) Downloads
Working Paper: Asymmetric Obligations (2011) Downloads
Working Paper: Asymmetric Obligations (2011) Downloads
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:zbw:fziddp:282011

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