Distribution and Development in a Model of Misgovernance
Keith Blackburn and
Gonzalo Forgues-Puccio ()
No 15, Proceedings of the German Development Economics Conference, Kiel 2005 from Verein für Socialpolitik, Research Committee Development Economics
Abstract:
This paper presents an analysis of bureaucratic corruption, income inequality and economic development. The analysis is based on a dynamic general equilibrium model in which bureaucrats are appointed by the government to implement a redistributive programme of taxes and subsidies designed to benefit the poor. Corruption is reflected in bribery and tax evasion as bureaucrats conspire with the rich in providing false information to the government. In accordance with empirical evidence, the model predicts a positive relationship between corruption and inequality, and a negative relationship between corruption and development.
Keywords: Corruption; inequality; development. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D31 D73 H26 O11 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2005
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-dev, nep-ltv and nep-pbe
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https://www.econstor.eu/bitstream/10419/19808/1/Furgues_Puccio.pdf (application/pdf)
Related works:
Journal Article: Distribution and development in a model of misgovernance (2007) 
Working Paper: Distribution and Development in a Model of Misgovernance (2004) 
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:zbw:gdec05:3488
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