Project Aid or Budget Aid? The Interests of Governments and Financial Institutions

Carsten Hefeker

No 19, Proceedings of the German Development Economics Conference, Kiel 2005 from Verein für Socialpolitik, Research Committee Development Economics

Abstract: The paper compares different aid policy instruments and their effect on the target group. Starting from a situation where interest groups compete for the resources of the government, international financial institutions aim to change the policy outcome. They can either directly support one group or condition their financial help to the government on its policy. Apart from a normative analysis which policy is more adequate to help one group, the paper also asks what happens if the IFI is driven by bureaucratic self-interest, and whether this distort policies.

Keywords: aid policy; conditionality; international financial institutions; interest groups (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D73 F35 O23 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2005
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-pol
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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Related works:
Journal Article: Project Aid or Budget Aid? The Interests of Governments and Financial Institutions (2006)
Working Paper: Project Aid or Budget Aid? The Interests of Governments and Financial Institutions (2005)
Working Paper: Project Aid or Budget Aid? The Interests of Governments and Financial Institutions (2004)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:zbw:gdec05:3492

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