Contesting Resources - Rent Seeking, Conflict and the Natural Resource Curse

Erwin Bulte and Katharina Wick

No 36, Proceedings of the German Development Economics Conference, Kiel 2005 from Verein für Socialpolitik, Research Committee Development Economics

Abstract: A growing empirical literature links natural resource abundance and "pointiness" to impeded economic growth and civil strife. We develop rent seeking and conflict models that capture the most salient features of contests for resource rents, and show how both resource abundance and geographical clustering can be associated with intense contests and sub-optimal economic performance. However, we also show that these relationships are not necessarily monotonous { pointiness can trigger more intense contests but can also facilitate the coordination on peaceful outcomes. Finally we show that contesting resources through violent conflict may yield superior outcomes (from an economy-wide perspective) than contests through rent seeking.

Keywords: point resources; civil war; economic growth and resources (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2005
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (14)

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Journal Article: Contesting resources – rent seeking, conflict and the natural resource curse (2006)
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